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Shifts aren't the cause for declining offense

Buster Olney has a great take on new commissioner Rob Manfred's ill-advised comments that he would consider eliminating shifts from the game in order to help inject more offense. Buster writes:

This is a really, really bad idea that should be dismissed quickly, as it was by the general managers who discussed it in a meeting last fall. Some old-school teams that have yet to embrace shifts backed the idea, but the more progressive teams widely rejected it, and rightly so.

As teams increasingly used shifts in recent years, some frustrated hitters have privately advocated for this kind of rule change. In listening to the complaints, I must admit that it was sometimes difficult to stifle laughter, just as it was when pitchers griped about the shrinking outfield dimensions of the ballparks in the '90s. I heard stories about pitchers taking tape measures onto fields at places like Camden Yards, where pitchers have questioned whether the distance from home plate to left-center field is actually 364 feet. ...

Pushing for rules to restrict defensive positioning would be as absurd and antithetical to the game as informing pitchers they can throw only pitches that are straight, or telling hitters they aren't allowed to swing at a hanging curveball.

Buster is obviously right here. Could you imagine a rule in the NFL eliminating the blitz? But here's an important thing to consider: Shifts don't save that many runs in the big scheme of things. Baseball Info Solutions tracks shift data and we know that the use of shifts has increased dramatically in recent seasons -- from 2,357 in 2011 to 13,296 in 2014. And since run scoring is down it's easy to explain the shift as a major contributor to the decline in offense.

Shifts are a contributor, but not a big one. BIS estimated the number of runs saved via shifting in 2014 at 195 runs across the majors -- or 6.5 runs per team, on average, over the entire season.

The average team scored 659 runs in 2014. Ten years ago in 2004, the average team scored 779 runs. So those 6.5 runs explain just 5 percent of the decline in offense over the past 10 years.

Of course, not all teams are heavy users of the shift so we'll likely continue to see more shifts in upcoming seasons and a resulting effect in runs scored. But it will remain a relatively minor effect. The biggest reason for the decline in offense, of course, is the increase in strikeouts. The batting average on balls in play (taking home runs out of the equation) was .299 in 2014. In 2004, it was .297. It peaked at .303 in 2007. In the early '90s -- a level of run scoring similar to now -- it was .287 in 1990 and .285 in 1991 and 1992. In fact, batting average on balls in play actually increased in 2014 from .297 in 2013 despite over 5,000 more shifts employed.

But there were 731 more strikeouts in 2014 than in 2013 and 5,613 more than 2004.

If the new commissioner wants more offense, he has to cut down on the strikeouts. That means changing the strike zone or lowering the mound.

Or telling pitchers they can only throw fastballs.